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Outline
– Cubesat philosophy and constraints
– Risk Classification for cubesats
– Mission Success activities to reduce defects
– Risk-based SMA
– Scaling of efforts for cubesats
– Building a cubesat mission success strategy from ground up
– Cubesat lifetime
– Cubesat as an inherited item
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Cubesat philosophy
• Understand the constraints
– Size (space limitations)
– Proximity of elements
– Cost and schedule resources
• Recognize the limited reliability history 
– Cubesat level – few developments using “high reliability” approach
– Cubesat components – very little reliability basis
• Develop new approach for establishing reliability
– Will require time to accumulate on-orbit data for system reliability
– Apply proven component-level accelerated testing approaches
• Ensure accelerated testing is validated against actual product reliability experiences (based on product failures in a 
relevant environment)  - be wary of “non-TAYF” lifetesting
• Overly conservative approach will be a showstopper
– Explore means for accelerated testing at system-level
– This is a ripe environment for model-based systems engineering and model-based mission assurance
• Determine efforts that provide the best bang for the buck
– Will not be able to afford typical minimum mission success activities for larger spacecraft
• At time of launch – be sure cubesat was thoroughly tested in environment and functions properly
– Open questions (unresolved anomalies) and limited system testing time are reliability threats 
• When possible, target constellation-level reliability
– Never at the expense of the debris environment or threats to people or property on the ground
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How do we best apply the available programmatic risk commodity and cost and schedule 
resources to make technical risk as low as possible?
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What is risk classification?
• Establishment of the level of risk tolerance from the stakeholder, with some 
independence from the cost
– Cost is covered through NPR 7120.5 Categories
• If we were to try to quantify the risk classification, it would be based on a ratio of 
programmatic risk tolerance to technical risk tolerance 
– For Class A, we take on enormous levels of programmatic risk in order to make 
technical risk as close to 0 as possible.  The assumption is that there are many 
options for trades and the fact is that there must be tolerance for overruns.  
– For Class D, there will be minimal tolerance for overruns and a greater need to 
be competitive, so there is a much smaller programmatic risk “commodity” to 
bring to the table
• The reality is that the differences between different classifications are more 
psychological (individual thoughts) and cultural (longstanding team beliefs and 
practices) than quantitative
• There is one technical requirement from HQ associated with risk classification:  
single point failures on Class A missions require waiver
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Risk Classification
• NPR 7120.5 Class C:  Moderate risk posture
– Represents an instrument or spacecraft whose loss would result in a loss or delay of some key national science objectives.
– Examples:  LRO, MMS, TESS, and ICON
• NPR 7120.5 Class D:  Cost/schedule are equal or greater considerations compared to mission success risks
– Allowable technical risk is medium by design (may be dominated by yellow risks).  
– Many credible mission failure mechanisms may exist.  A failure to meet Level 1 requirements prior to minimum lifetime would 
be treated as a mishap.
– Examples:  LADEE, IRIS, NICER, and DSCOVR
• NPR 7120.8 “Class” – Allowable technical risk is high 
– Some level of failure at the project level is expected; but at a higher level (e.g., program level), there would normally be an 
acceptable failure rate of individual projects, such as 15%.   
– Life expectancy is generally very short, although instances of opportunities in space with longer desired lifetimes are appearing.  
– Failure of an individual project prior to mission lifetime is considered as an accepted risk and would not constitute a mishap. 
(Example:  ISS-CREAM)
• “Do No Harm” Projects – If not governed by NPR 7120.5 or 7120.8, we classify these as “Do No Harm”, unless another 
requirements document is specified 
– Allowable technical risk is very high.  
– There are no requirements to last any amount of time, only a requirement not to harm the host platform (ISS, host spacecraft, etc.).  
– No mishap would be declared if the payload doesn’t function.   (Note: Some payloads that may be self-described as Class D actually 
belong in this category.)  (Example:  CATS, RRM)
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Risk can be characterized by number of defects that affect performance or reliability
and the impact of each. Defects are generally of design or workmanship. 
Note: A thorough environmental test program will ensure most risks are programmatic (cost/schedule) until very late, when time and money run out.
Defects vs Mission Success
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Generally-representative example, prioritization may vary by mission attributes 
or personal preference or experience.
Mission Success Activities
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Defects vs Mission Success as a function 
of risk classification
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Time at which defect is caught
The more layers that are removed, the later defects are likely to be caught 
(if they are caught), the more work that has to be “undone”, the more 
testing that has to be redone, and the more likely the project is to suffer 
severe programmatic impact and/or to fly with added residual risk.  
Launch 
date
Mission 
Cost +
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Removing layers results in some defects not being caught, 
and some being caught later
Programmatic risk of reduced efforts
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What is Risk-Based SMA?
The process of applying limited resources to maximize the chance for safety & 
mission success by focusing on mitigating specific risks that are applicable to 
the project vs. simply enforcing a set of requirements because they have 
always worked
9
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Risk-based SMA
• Risk-informed framework
• Risk-informed requirements generation
• Risk-informed decisions
• Risk-informed review and audit
10
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Note:  Always determine the cause before making repeated attempts 
to produce a product after failures or nonconformances
• Upfront assessment of reliability and risk, e.g. tall poles, to prioritize how resources and 
requirements will be applied
• Early discussions with developer on their approach for ensuring mission success (e.g., 
use of high-quality parts for critical items and lower grade parts where design is fault-
tolerant) and responsiveness to feedback
• Judicious application of requirements based on learning from previous projects and the 
results from the reliability/risk assessment, and the operating environment (Lessons 
Learned – multiple sources, Cross-cutting risk assessments etc)
• Careful consideration of the approach recommended by the developer
• Characterization of risk for nonconforming items to determine suitability for use – project 
makes determination whether to accept, not accept, or mitigate risks based on 
consideration of all risks
• Continuous review of requirements for suitability based on current processes, 
technologies, and recent experiences
• Consideration of the risk of implementing a requirement and the risk of not implementing 
the requirement.
Attributes of Risk-Based SMA
11
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Scaling of efforts for cubesats
• In general, mission success activities for cubesats do not scale down linearly 
as compared to larger missions
– Environmental test 
• Elements of “religion” (number of thermal cycles, sine vs random, etc) do 
not scale down
• Time to reach thermal equilibrium does scale down
– Inspection
• Overhead of performing inspection at various points remains
• Volume of inspection does scale down
– Operating time
• Operating time to ensure system-level design and workmanship issues 
are exposed does not scale down
– Qualification of new elements does not scale down
12
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Building an SMA approach from the 
ground up
1. Mission Success Tiers:  For a given application, arrange mission success 
activities from low ratio of programmatic risk to technical risk and low ratio of 
cost-and-schedule resources to technical risk to high ratio of programmatic 
risk to technical risk and high ratio of cost-and-schedule resources to 
technical risk
2. Build mission success activity profile based on risk tolerance (risk 
classification):  Recommend graded approach of applying activities starting 
from low ratios, working towards high, to build the lowest achievable risk 
posture holistically, within resource constraints
3. Expected lifetime:  Apply processes and analyses that address lifetime 
concerns:
– Limited life items
– Expendables
– Qualification period duration or accelerated life (or other reliability basis)
13
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Sample from Tables (Mission Success 
lower tiers)
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2A:  Medium Ratio of Programmatic Risk to Technical Risk
- Protoflight vibe
- RS testing
2B:  Medium Ratio of Programmatic 
Resources to Technical Risk
- 3-6 TVAC cycles (after 2 earlier)
- Level 3 EEE parts
- 1000 or more hours of operation
- Select mandatory inspection points
- Use of formal WOA system
- Select engineering units for high risk/new items
- Focused engineering peer review
- Fault-tolerant design using FMECA, FTA, and/or critical items 
analysis as a basis
- Design for manufacturability
- FPGA peer review
- Observatory level qualification
- Self-performed software assurance
- GIDEP self-review
- GOLD rules as guidance
- Radiation qualification by similarity
3A:  Low Ratio of Programmatic Risk to Technical Risk
- First two TVAC cycles, minimum 50 hours
- Last 150 hours of failure free operation
- Vibe at 1.05 flight levels
- EMI self-compatibility 
- Radiation-tolerant design
3B:  Low Ratio of Programmatic Resources to Technical Risk
- First four thermal cycles
- EEE part derating
- Parts stress analysis
- Random vibe
- First 500 hours of operation
- Close-out inspection
- Early holistic risk assessment
- “iphone” photography
- informal independent SME review (graybeard mentoring)
- spare printed circuit board or coupon for future DPA
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Sample from Tables (Risk Tolerance)
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7120.5 Class C 7120.5 Class D 7120.8 Do No Harm
Stakeholder perspective An instrument or 
spacecraft whose loss 
would result in a loss or 
delay of some key 
national science 
objectives. New 
technologies may be 
employed that may not 
be fully compatible with 
some traditional 
requirements, requiring 
alternative approaches 
for ensuring mission 
success. 
Cost and schedule are of 
equal or greater 
consideration compared 
to mission success risks. 
Allowable technical risk is 
medium by design (may 
be dominated by yellow 
risks). Many credible 
mission failure 
mechanisms may exist. 
New technologies may be 
employed that may not 
be fully compatible with 
some traditional 
requirements. 
Acceptable technical risk 
is high. Some level of 
failure at the project 
level is expected but at a 
higher level (program 
level), there would 
normally be an 
acceptable failure rate of 
individual missions (such 
as 85% mission success 
rate over some time 
period). Premature 
failure of an individual 
mission is considered as 
an accepted risk, and not 
a mishap.
Acceptable technical risk 
is very high. There are no 
requirements to last any 
amount of time, only not 
to harm the host 
platform (ISS, host 
spacecraft, etc.). No 
mishap would be 
declared if the mission 
doesn’t perform as 
planned.  Such missions 
may be considered to be 
an “on-orbit 
environmental test”.
Key emphasis Robust testing and  
consideration of fault 
tolerance in the mission 
architecture and 
hardware designs
Thorough testing and 
some consideration of 
fault tolerance
“Program level” fault 
tolerance (some failures 
expected)
Protecting the host, 
learning from anomalies 
and failures
Tier selection 2A, 2B, 3A, 3B, select 
levels from 1A, 1B
3A, 3B, and select 2A and 
2B elements
3A and 3B Select 3A and 3B 
elements
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Expected lifetime
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< 3 months 3-months-1 year 1-5 years > 5 years
Main attributes Min. 100 hrs
system-level 
testing time.  No 
additional EEE 
part or 
component 
screening or 
qualification 
(acceptance only) 
– does it function 
at launch
Min. 200 hrs
system-level 
testing time.  
Selective 
part/component 
screening and 
qualification 
(beyond COTS) –
thorough 
environmental 
test
Min. 500 hrs
system-level 
testing time.  
Thorough part 
and component 
screening and 
qualification, 
thorough 
environmental 
test
Min.  1000 hrs
system-level 
testing time.  
Complete part 
and component 
screening and 
qualification, 
testing consistent 
with large 
spacecraft 
Limited life (LL) 
items, 
expendables
Sizing 
expendables is 
the primary 
consideration 
Increased analysis 
or margins for 
expendables plus 
analysis or test for 
selected LL items
Increased analysis 
and margins for 
expendables plus 
analysis and test 
for most LL  items
Increased analysis 
and margins for 
expendables plus 
analysis and test 
for all LL items
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Other Processes
• Materials:  NASA-STD-6016 with discretion
• Workmanship:  NASA trained technicians
• ESD – aligned with sensitivity, not necessarily risk-tolerance
• Interface FMEA to protect the host platform and the environment
• Launch/range safety 
– Tailored NASA-STD-8719.24
– LSP-Req-317.01 (for LSP hosted cubesats)
• Debris requirements from NPR 8715.6, NASA-STD-8719.14
17
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Inherited Items Process
• Baselined in GPR 8730.5:  SMA acceptance of inherited and build-to-print 
hardware
• Centrally handled for all projects to ensure that process is implemented 
uniformly and that prior analyses are used to the greatest extent
• Folds in the more traditional heritage reviews to this process
18
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Example Standard Components
• Star Trackers
• Gyros/IMUs
• Reaction Wheel Assemblies
• Magnetometers
• Torquer bars
• Battery Relays
• High performance stepper motors and actuators
• Piezoelectric motors
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“Traditional” GSFC SMA practices
• Strongly requirements-based
• Commercial practices only by exception
• Previously-developed and build-to-print items required to meet all 
requirements or work through standard MRB process
• Treatment of each item as if it is the first time we’ve seen it
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Practices/features that have caused 
“unease” at GSFC
• Pure Sn/insufficient Pb/prohibited materials
• Board modifications (white wires, etc)
• Level 3 or COTS parts
• Use of bare board specs outside of our common requirements 
• Use of unfamiliar workmanship standards
• Use of Table 2 or Table 3 materials
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Previous approach of handling 
COTS/inherited/build-to-print items
• Generally bottoms up approach for each project
• Standard parts control board approvals
• Acceptance based on elements and processes vs component-level 
assessment
• Emphasis on requirements, risk generally considered when push comes to 
shove
• Rejection of modified boards based on quantity of modifications and 
appearance
These processes drive up cost and risk for larger spacecraft, would lead to demise of 
cubesat projects
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Transition to Risk-based approach
• Early discussion about inherited items being brought to the table
• Directives for proactively handling inherited items
– Based on changes from previous developments
• Design
• Environment
• Failures and anomalies
– Based on assessment of elevated risk
• Component level qualification and history
• Use of Commodity Risk Assessment Engineer
• Focus is on “what is new” and risk areas determined from past history
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Standard Components CRAE
• Center lead over all Standard Components 
responsible for 
– Standard Components Commodity Usage Guidelines
– Capturing lessons learned for each project usage, from 
procurement, through development, to on-orbit experiences
– Interface to orgs outside of GSFC
– Determining risk for unusual usage, or for nonconforming or 
out-of-family standard components
– Establish testing and qualification programs as needed
• Focus on applying consistent processes across all projects, emphasizing the 
“deltas”, and not repeating the same requests 
• Approval in the past may not guarantee approval on current project if the risk 
posture, lifetime, redundancy, or environment has changed
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Standard Components Commodity Usage 
Guidelines
• GSFC-determined derating or usage limits for components
• History of workmanship standards applied, expectations, and ground 
experiences
• Known EEE parts outside of GSFC’s experience base
• Known materials outside of GSFC’s experience base
• Ground and on-orbit nonconformance, anomaly, and failure history
• Prior risk assessments
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Acceptance of Inherited Items
• Information provided upfront
• Review and analysis 
• Risk Assessment performed
• Risk LxC and statement provided to the CSO
• CSO and Project make the call on acceptance based on risk-level
• Results are documented at the Center level
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Inheritance Process Overview
Initiate 
Inheritance 
Plans
Perform and 
Document 
Inheritance Data and 
Assessments
Conduct or Support 
TIMS/WGs and 
Reviews
Refine and Finalize 
Inheritance 
Assessments 
Obtain Final Inheritance 
SMA Endorsement and 
Risk  Assessment 
1.1 Develop Inheritance 
Plan:
- Identify potential 
components 
(spares, COTS, Std 
components, Build-
to-Print)  that are 
suitable for the 
mission**
- Determine data 
available from SC 
CRAE/ 
vendor/previous 
project.
1.2 Conduct mission 
suitability Analysis
Note 1: An initial SC 
CRAE contact meeting 
may be held to establish 
project intentions and 
risk posture as well as 
inheritance options
** Heritage type reviews 
may be a source for 
items
3.1A Conduct Inheritance 
Review Panel Data Evaluations 
and/or Risk TIMs/WGs  to 
formulate Risk Assessments 
including workmanship 
assessment.
3.1B Conduct formal 
inheritance review to acquire 
acceptance of project risk 
assessments in lieu of 
component level PDR/CDRs.
3.2 Identify/resolve
open inheritance concerns,
action items, and
Discrepancies;
2.1 Gather and Prepare Inheritance 
Data Package (See Note 2) for each 
item or group of items
2.2 Distribute an Inheritance Data 
Package within 30 days of MCR/ATP 
2.3 Convene Inheritance Review 
Panel (SC CRAE) even if no data 
supplied
Note 2: Include all data specified in 
GPR 8730.5 but at a minimum: 
a) List of inherited items and statement 
of approach;
c) Summary results of qualification, 
acceptance, and/or testing 
completed, and comparison of 
current requirements;
d) Storage and/or Flight history of the 
items and specific attributes for each 
flight, including environments;
e) Ground and on-orbit performance 
violations anomaly and failure 
history including the determination 
of root causes;
k) The reliability analyses performed 
for the most recent version of the 
product. 
l) Identification of significant 
changes in design, facility, 
process, subtier supplier, testing 
changes, company change of 
ownership, or any change from 
qualified unit to current unit 
See GPR 8730.5 Section 4.7 for 
Software.
4.1 Prepare and Distribute 
Final Inheritance Data 
Package 
4.2 Obtain Final Risk 
Assessments from SC CRAE  
and Inheritance Review 
Panel/SMEs. (See Note 3)
4.3 Update CUG with 
Inherited Item data gathered. 
(SC CRAE)
Note 3: The SC CRAE risk 
assessment will include 
resulting  risk statement(s) 
with a likelihood and 
consequence in the standard 
GSFC 5x5 format with 
mitigation options  or a 
statement that there is no 
elevated risk associated with 
use of the item I and in either 
cases a requirement tailoring 
recommendation. This will be 
in the form of a cover letter 
/memo for the final 
Inheritance Data Package.
5.1 Accept final SMA 
endorsement and Risk 
Assessment from SC CRAE/SMA
5.2 Include Inherited Item Risk 
Assessment results in upper-level 
milestone reviews.
5.2 Manage Risks Identified 
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Inherited items for cubesats
• Many standard CubeSat components now exist
• Substantial reliability benefits for using previously qualified items
• However, these give rise to constraints that may increase the system design 
challenge
• In general, it may be desirable to treat the cubesat itself as an 
“inherited” or COTS item
– Ensure mission success and reliability through holistic assessment, 
rather than piece parts approvals (alternate approach)
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Summary
• Cubesats demand a unique approach due to a unique set of constraints
• Two approaches are suggested here
– Prioritizing mission success activities by ratios of programmatic risk to 
technical risk and programmatic resources to technical risk
– Holistic assessment of the cubesats, where piece parts are secondary 
contributing elements
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